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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

ETHICS AND THE LEGITIMATION OF
THE PURSUIT OF EQUITY IN SCHOOL FINANCE

JAMES GORDON WARD*

I. INTRODUCTION
The distribution of state funds for public education has been a contentious
issue in public policy for almost two centuries, with most of the early litigation
occurring at the state court level. This issue reached the federal courts as an
equal protection issue in the late 1960s.1 The culminating federal case,
decided in 1973, was San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, in
which the United States Supreme Court held that the tremendous revenue
disparities per pupil that existed among Texas public school districts did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 The
Rodriguez case is still good law, never having been overturned by the nation’s
highest court.3 Similar cases, usually based on alleged violations of the equal
protection clause or education clause of an individual state’s constitution, have
been brought in a large share of states with mixed results. Where education is
considered a fundamental constitutional right, plaintiffs have prevailed in their
attempts to overturn the state school finance system. Where education is not a
fundamental right, the state governments tend to prevail in court.4 It is fair to
say that no new legal ground has been broken in this category of cases for quite
some time. It is also safe to say that the judicial attempts to reduce inequities
in school revenue per pupil, for the most part, have been stalled. This is not to

* B.A. (history), M.A. (history), M.P.A. (public administration), Ed.D. (education). The author is
professor emeritus of education, and of government and public affairs at the University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign, and currently is a student in theology at Seabury-Western Theological
Seminary.
1. KERN ALEXANDER & M. DAVID ALEXANDER, AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW 888
(5th ed. 2001).
2. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 54-55 (1973).
3. See ALEXANDER & ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 894 (although two subsequent cases
“suggest that Rodriquez is not a complete foreclosure of further federal litigation,” the basic
position of the Supreme Court “has not changed”).
4. See William E. Sparkman, School Finance Challenges in State Courts, in THE IMPACTS
OF LITIGATION AND LEGISLATION ON PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE: ADEQUACY, EQUITY, AND
EXCELLENCE 203-04 (Julie K. Underwood & Deborah A. Verstegen eds., 1990).
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say that there has been no activity in recent years, but rather that most activity
has been on the margins of the issue.
The purposes of this paper are to explore the normative aspects of the issue
and the ethics of the quest for school finance equity in the desire to construct
an ethical case that could bolster the argument for more equal funding in the
political arena. This paper will begin with a review of school finance theory
and proceed to an application of the ethical theory pertaining to this issue. It
may be a naïve assumption, but the basis of this paper is that the citizenry and
elected representatives may be more open to moral arguments than the courts.
It also may be a fatalistic view of what has transpired in the courts over the last
three decades, but this paper is predicated on a view that current efforts have
not brought success and that a new view of the issues might be in order.
II. SCHOOL FINANCE THEORY
A.

The Early Theorists

Ellwood P. Cubberley presented fundamental theory in school finance in
the United States almost a century ago in his now classic doctoral dissertation.5
Cubberley wrote:
Theoretically, all the children of the state are equally important and are entitled
to have the same advantages; practically this can never be quite true. The duty
of the state is to secure for all as high a minimum of good instruction as is
possible, but not to reduce all to this minimum; to equalize the advantages to
all as nearly as can be done with the resources at hand; to place a premium on
those local efforts which will enable communities to rise above the legal
minimum as far as possible; and to encourage communities to extend their
educational energies to new and desirable undertakings.6

If Cubberley’s guidelines are followed, there is little else to advance as school
finance guidelines.
We begin with the premise that all children are equal, a reminder of our
fundamental national organic documents, and that they therefore deserve equal
treatment in schools or, at least, are entitled to have the same advantages.7
Children are equal unless there is a valid reason to treat them unequally.
School finance reform litigators argue that children are treated unequally based
on the residence of the children’s parents or legal guardians. Where children
reside is a significant determinant in the amount of funds available for their
education. A high correlation exists between low levels of funding and
communities in which there are significant proportions of low income or racial

5. ELLWOOD P. CUBBERLEY, SCHOOL FUNDS AND THEIR APPORTIONMENT 3 (1905).
6. Id. at 17.
7. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
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minority populations.8 As the original plaintiffs in Rodriguez argued, there are
poor children in poor school districts that receive a level of education far below
that of other children.9 Cubberley conceded that the equality of all children is
not possible to maintain in a public school system.10 However, he stated that
the state has a duty to maintain the highest level of instruction possible for all
children.11 The term “duty” seems to imply a fairly high level of moral
obligation in Cubberley’s writing. That is, the state is to equalize the
advantages of all children within the limitations of the current resource level.12
He does not suggest that the state may ignore equalizing revenues if
insufficient funds are available but that advantages (or services) should be
equalized.13 Most states have twisted this concept to say that if resources are
not sufficient — and they almost never are — then a wide variety of funding
levels are acceptable, thereby establishing a considerably diminished standard
of care.14
Cubberley also stated that local communities should make local efforts
both to exceed the minimum levels of education as far as possible and to be
innovative in providing educational services.15 Cubberley’s recommendation
to states was that they needed to develop state school finance systems that
compensated local districts for unequal local fiscal capacity to support public
education.16 In these state systems, local school districts with lower local tax
capacity per pupil were to receive higher state subventions per pupil, and
school districts with higher per pupil capacity would receive lower state aid.17
This theoretical model of Cubberley’s was operationalized in the 1920s in the
foundation system of school finance, which is still the fundamental basis of
many state school finance systems.18 If foundation systems had been
constructed and funded the way Cubberley visualized, then they would have

8. See, e.g., Joseph S. Patt, School Finance Battles: Survey Says? It’s All Just a Change in
Attitudes, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 547, 549 (1999).
9. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 23.
10. CUBBERLEY, supra note 5, at 16-17.
11. Id. at 17.
12. Id. at 18.
13. Id. at 20.
14. See, e.g., Joseph B. Harrington, Current Developments in the Law: A Survey of Cases
Affecting Public Education, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 171, 172 (1994) (describing plaintiff’s
argument in McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993), that
the state system resulted in wide disparity in school funding among towns and was insufficient to
compensate for shortfalls in local revenues).
15. CUBBERLEY, supra note 5, at 17-18.
16. Id. at 27.
17. Id. at 252-53.
18. R. CRAIG WOOD & DAVID C. THOMPSON, EDUCATIONAL FINANCE LAW:
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO STATE AID PLANS – AN ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIES 6 (1993).
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achieved Cubberley’s goal of having the states treating all children as if they
were equal.19 No state, however, has been willing to incur the cost of doing so.
The second significant contribution to school finance theory was the work
of Henry Morrison at the University of Chicago during the late 1920s and early
1930s.20 His direct response to Cubberley’s scheme was the question, “[i]s
there money enough to support any such school system as Americans have
conceived?”21 Morrison reviewed the system that had been developed to fund
local schools, based on Cubberley’s ideas and their practical manifestations,
and asked:
Can moneys in the possession of the state government be so distributed among
districts of varying fiscal ability as to establish everywhere equivalent schools
capable of carrying out the essential purpose of adequately educating and
training the childhood and youth of the state, and at the same time be so
distributed as to make the burden of taxation equal in all districts?22

Morrison presented his readers with a summary set of conditions and
invited the reader to answer the question he posed.23 He presented the facts in
such a way that the answer was an unmistakable “no.”24 Morrison moved
toward his conclusion that:
Our extended analysis of the nature of the state school as a civil institution, of
its economic and financial foundations, of the requirements of a fiscal and
political structure founded on the school district in its various territorial forms,
leads us unerringly to the conclusion that the several states themselves are the
appropriate fiscal and administrative units in support and conduct of
citizenship schools which has long been held to be the cornerstone of our
policy as a self-governing State.25

Morrison emphasized that the local school district, even with intricate state
systems of finance, cannot achieve Cubberley’s goal of all children being
treated equally and argued that equality can only be achieved through the state
as the fiscal and administrative unit for schooling, not local districts.26
Morrison anticipated the objections to his proposed system but argued that:
The objection to taxation for purposes which are in principal and reality state
or national, merely because certain taxables have become concentrated in cities
or in a few states, is, of course, equivalent to an objection on the part of rich
families to be taxed on their ability to pay taxes, lest they should thereby be
made to carry the burdens of other people. The point is fundamental in the
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

CUBBERLEY, supra note 5, at 17.
HENRY C. MORRISON, SCHOOL REVENUE vi (1930).
Id. at v.
Id. at 202.
Id. at 202-03.
See id. at 203-04.
MORRISON, supra note 20, at 214.
Id. at 230.
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whole theory of the individual’s relation to civil society . . . . When the
purpose is inherently a state purpose, as is the case with public schools, it
matters not where the taxables are concentrated, assuming no uneconomic use
of the taxing power is made. Even though 90 percent of the taxables are in a
single city, the obligation rests as heavily on the taxpayers of that city as local
obligations which are related to municipal purposes pure and simple.27

Morrison made it quite clear that public education is a state function and
needs to be supported financially at the state level through a state system of
public education.28 If one substitutes the term “suburb” for the term “city” in
Morrison’s statements, his words have a very contemporary ring. When these
words were published in 1930, they were ignored by policymakers for at least
two reasons.29 First, the nation was in the depths of the Great Depression, and
there were no funds available to move in this direction. Secondly, the political
climate was not conducive to the arguments and conclusions put forth by
Morrison.30
By 1930, three basic elements were clear. First, there is no civil reason to
discriminate among children in the quality of public schooling; all children are
equal. Second, state intergovernmental systems, which leave administrative
and fiscal control with local school districts, do not provide equity. Third,
state constitutional responsibility for public education in a civil society likely
requires state systems of education with administrative and fiscal responsibility
resting at the state level.
B.

Later School Finance Theorists

The issue of ending unequal treatment of children in financing public
schools received less attention during the period of the Great Depression,
national and international crises of the Second World War, and the return to
peace and rapid growth of the public schools in the late 1940s and early 1950s.
Attention to equal treatment and equal opportunities returned in the mid-1950s,
symbolized by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1954 decision of Brown v. Board of
Education.31 Many legal scholars and educational researchers view the logic
of Brown as a possible avenue for school finance equity.32
One such scholar, Arthur Wise, delved into the research in legal theory in
order to construct an argument that might convince the courts that Cubberley’s
ideal of all children being equal might not be congruent with the fundamental

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 220-21.
Id. at 214.
WOOD & THOMPSON, supra note 18, at 9.
See id.
Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
See ARTHUR E. WISE, RICH SCHOOLS POOR SCHOOLS: THE PROMISE OF EQUAL
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES 174 (1968).
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law of the nation.33 Wise published his findings as Rich Schools, Poor
Schools: The Promise of Equal Educational Opportunity.34 According to
Wise, “[t]he purpose of this study is, then, to determine whether the absence of
equal educational opportunity within a state, as evidenced by unequal per-pupil
expenditures, many constitute a denial by the state of the equal protection of its
laws.”35 The study went well beyond education law and looked at criminal law
as a possible template for education cases to combat unequal educational
opportunity. Wise found that:
Educational inequality facilitated by a system of local financing exists because
of a combination of at least three factors: the self-interest of the privileged,
their tendency to reside apart from the lower class, and the inability of the
average person to assess the quality of education available to his child, much
less know what is available elsewhere.36

Wise then suggested that the solution of this problem belongs in the federal
courts because, like school desegregation, this issue involves a federal Equal
Protection Clause violation, and the states have been politically unable to
successfully deal with the issues involved.37 In an interesting fashion, Wise
concluded his study by stating that the issue fundamentally rests on values and
cites some of the conflicting values expressed on the issue of how to provide
equal educational opportunity.38 This matter will be revisited below.
In their comprehensive study of the issue of unequal educational
opportunity, John Coons, William Clune, and Stephen Sugarman began with a
discussion of values.39 They also provided a historical overview of the
development of state school finance systems and a survey of the current system
Coons and his colleagues provided the following
characteristics.40
conclusions:
Various children do in fact get the worst offerings, and as to those with the
worst offerings we are sufficiently confident that (1) although the impact of
district effort on this plight could be more than previously thought, wealth is
still the significant factor and (2) for whatever it is worth, most of them are
children of poor families.41

Coons and his colleagues also considered a variety of financing systems to
rectify the situation they identified and a full state funding system, not

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 197.
WISE, supra note 32, at 197-98.
Id. at 209-12.
See JOHN E. COONS ET AL., PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 1 (1970).
Id.
Id. at 160.
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dissimilar to the solution proposed by Morrison, was one of the options.42
They also proposed a power equalizing state aid system for subventions to
local school districts that would have substantially the same effect.43 The legal
researchers plead that “[l]egal and political strategies must be developed to
give practical meaning to the theories offered here. Many approaches are
possible, and we do not intend to be exhaustive, prediction is difficult and
tactics are peculiarly a matter of time and place.”44 Time and place do matter,
and the politics are difficult. However, between Wise and Coons and his
colleagues, a legal theory had been developed which supplemented and
complemented the school finance theories developed by Cubberley and
Morrison.
C. Theory into Practice
It is not the intention of this article to review the litigation that arose from
the development of these theoretical approaches. Suffice it to say, as a result
of the Rodriguez case cited previously, the federal courts remain closed to
challenges of unequal spending and unequal educational opportunities because
the nation’s highest court has not found such funding disparities to be violative
of the U.S. Constitution.45 The pattern of state high court decisions has been
mixed regarding equal protection, and where most plaintiffs have won their
cases, it has been on the basis of the state’s education articles or clauses.46
More importantly, there is little evidence to show that after more than three
decades of litigation in this field, the spending disparities per child in the states
have been substantially reduced because of the litigation.47 As Cubberley
hinted, and as Morrison and Wise have stated, there are political factors that
have been barriers.48 The politics of self-interest and privilege have
dominated. Any program of meaningful equalization of school funding would
require massive shifts in funding from the affluent to the poor. Without
belaboring the point, this has not yet been possible.

42. See id. at 201-02.
43. Id. at 200-42.
44. COONS, supra note 39, at 435.
45. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 54-56 (1973).
46. WOOD & THOMPSON, supra note 18, at 179 (1993).
47. See Douglas S. Reed, Twenty-Five Years After Rodriguez: School Finance Litigation &
the Impact of the New Judicial Federalism, 32 L. & SOC’Y REV. 175, 177 (1998).
48. CUBBERLEY, supra note 5; MORRISON, supra note 20; WISE, supra note 32.
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III. ETHICAL THEORY
A.

Foundations of Ethics

Ethics is about making choices. Ethics relating to school finance is about
making funding choices among alternatives in terms of who gets what, when,
and how.49 A number of the school finance theorists have talked about values
in school finance.50 The courts have considered the constitutional value of
equal protection of the law.51 Ethics is fundamentally about values.
Ethics is about moral choices. It is about the values that lie behind them, the
reasons people give for them, and the language they use to describe them. It is
about innocence and guilt, right and wrong, and what it means to live a good or
bad life. It is about the dilemmas of life, death, sex, violence, and money.52

Ethics as it relates to school finance is, of course, about money. Plato held that
justice in society was not just the interest of the strongest, or the most affluent,
but that reason should prevail and that civic questions in society should be
answered rationally, with a strong degree of disinterest.53 Jeremy Bentham
argued for an utilitarian ethics that provided the greatest good for the greatest
number in society.54 Therefore, it would seem that an ethical approach to
school finance would involve some rational determination of what would
produce the greatest good for the greatest number in a system of financing
public schools.
Immanuel Kant carried this argument forward with his concept of the
“Categorical Imperative.”55 To understand Kant’s position, we start with the
“universalization” test: “what if everyone did that?”56 What if everyone voted
to provide greater funding for the education of their own children and less for
the funding for the education of other children? Clearly, under those
circumstances, the affluent and powerful would have more money available for
the education of their children than would the poor, not unlike the situation we
now have in the United States. Kant also believed that the purpose of
education is, in the words of one commentary, “to develop a human being with
a sense of dignity and duty.”57 For Kant, a person’s duty is to act as if the
consequences of his actions are what everyone else will do. In other words, act

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

WOOD & THOMPSON, supra note 18, at 53.
See, e.g., COONS, supra note 39; CUBBERLEY, supra note 5; WISE, supra note 32.
See, e.g., Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 1.
MEL THOMPSON, ETHICS 5 (1994).
Id. at 153-54.
Id. at 88-92.
SIMON BLACKBURN, BEING GOOD 116-24 (2001).
Id. at 117.
ROBERT S. BRUMBAUGH & NATHANIEL M. LAWRENCE, PHILOSOPHERS ON
EDUCATION: SIX ESSAYS ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF WESTERN THOUGHT 102 (1963).
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as if your actions will be universalized. This is the Formula of Universal Law
in his Categorical Imperative.58 This translates into our dealings with others
and our show of respect for others. Robert Blackburn stated that this “takes
Kant to the Formula of Humanity: ‘So act that you use humanity, whether in
your own person or the person of any other, always at the same time as an end,
never merely as a means.’”59
John Rawls extended this argument with his “veil of ignorance,” which
argued that because we do not know what role in society we will end up
occupying, we should act as if we might occupy any role and strive for a
justice that treats all fairly.60 This would require a fair and equal distribution
of funds for public education.
From this foundation in ethics, one could argue that Cubberley’s ideal that
“all the children of the state are equally important and are entitled to have the
same advantages” can be considered a Categorical Imperative and one that
needs to be the result of any valid school finance policy. A brief consideration
of the foundations of ethics destroys any ethical argument that the affluent
should have more funds available for the education of their children than do
the poor or less powerful. School finance reform would seem to be an ethical
issue as well as a legal issue.
B.

Ethics and Public Policy

The literature in the public policy arena that deals with ethics provides
little additional hope of an ethical approach to legitimate school finance
reform. Dwight Waldo, in a classic work in the field of public administration,
argued that much of modern political science and public administration theory
strives to be scientific and rational and eschews the ethical approach that
dominated in the Gilded Age and during the Progressive Movement.61 He
further stated that now the field sees morality as irrelevant.62 Louis Gawthrop
also saw a lack of focus on moral values in the public sector and found
morality to be at least second to pragmatic considerations.63 Gawthrop found
that the public sector used a shield of procedural ethics to block it from having
to consider issues of justice.64 George Frederickson also had advanced these
notions, arguing that controversial issues involving ethics in the public sector
tend to be pushed toward the legislative arena, with some being resolved by the

58. BLACKBURN, supra note 55, at 120.
59. Id. at 124.
60. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971).
61. DWIGHT WALDO, THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 24-25 (2d ed. 1984).
62. Id.
63. LOUIS C. GAWTHROP, PUBLIC SERVICE AND DEMOCRACY: ETHICAL IMPERATIVES FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY 89 (1998).
64. Id. at 157.
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judiciary.65 These voices from public sector ethics all seem to converge to an
opinion that current moral sensitivities in the public sector would favor a
continuation of the status quo, with the legislative branch not dealing with
school finance reform because of the difficulties of redistributive policies, and
the judicial branch failing to act by shifting responsibility to the executive
branch. Moral issues seem to be in the background.
C. Postmodern Ethics
The ethical views discussed so far are clearly products of the Age of
Reason, which intellectual historians and philosophers call “modernity,” a
period and worldview that holds “rationality” to be a fundamental value.66 We
have now slipped into a period of “postmodernity” where the worldview and
values have changed. Philosopher Richard Rorty discussed how the ethical
views based on Kant are predicated on trying to find the commonalities in civic
society, trying to find the big things that we agree upon.67 Pragmatic
philosophy in this postmodern era focuses more on reconciling small
differences in community than the big differences in humanity.68 This would
suggest a stronger interest in dealing with ethical issues in ordinary life than in
the realm of public policy.
This same theme was developed in David Harvey’s The Condition of
Postmodernity.69 Harvey saw the modern period as characterized by ethics,
state intervention, regulation, and state welfarism, whereas the postmodern
period is characterized by aesthetics, laissez-faire, deregulation, and neoconservatism, all suggesting that the opportunities for equal educational
opportunity through political or legal means may be diminished.70 Diarmuid
O’Murchu provided a similar analysis by seeing modernism as more focused
on institutions, hierarchy, systems and structures, the importance of the end
product, and change from outside the system to a postmodern culture with
primacy of relationships, equality, interdependence and mutuality, the
importance of the interactions, and change evolving from within.71 The point
is that Kant’s universality principle seems to have less salience in the
postmodern period, and this likely reduces the ethical pressures for school
finance reform.
This assessment was echoed by Immanuel Wallerstein, who provided an
analysis of the shifting world-system by arguing that a period of stability in

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

H. GEORGE FREDERICKSON, THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 175 (1997).
See DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY 9-12 (1990).
RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE 86 (1999).
Id. at 86-87.
See HARVEY, supra note 66, at 9-14.
Id. at 9-10.
See generally, DIARMUID O’MURCHU, OUR WORLD IN TRANSITION (2000).
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classic liberal politics and economic capitalism since the French Revolution,
which others would call modernism, has come to an end with the world-wide
social revolutions of 1968, end of the Pax Americana in the 1970s, and the fall
of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s.72 Wallerstein described the recent past
as a period where:
[p]opular antistatism was ambivalent. On the one hand, it implied a general
delegitimation of state structures, and a turn to extrastate institutions of moral
solidarity and pragmatic self-protection. The revived conservative movement
sought to use this sentiment to dismantle welfare state provisions, and met
much resistance by popular strata seeking to hold on to acquired benefits and
opposed measures that would, in reality, diminish their real incomes further . . .
[t]here is no enthusiasm. The absence of hope, and of faith, remains pervasive
and corrosive.73

This presents a pessimistic picture for any significant policy change
through the current political system that would involve redistribution of
resources from the affluent to the poor. Wallerstein’s mention of “pragmatic
self-protection” is consistent with Rorty’s notion of the reconciliation of small
differences and the hesitancy for the body politic to take on large issues that
involve state intervention or state regulation. The welfare state is being
dismantled, not augmented. Wallerstein further stated that:
Far from representing the triumph of liberalism, and even less of renewed
conservatism, this pervasive antistatism, by delegitimating the state structures,
has undermined an essential pillar of the modern world-system, the states
system, a pillar without which the endless accumulation of capital is not
possible. The ideological celebration of so-called globalization is in reality the
swansong of our historical system.74

The postmodern world has moved toward antistatism, individualism, a
deligitimation of major social institutions, and a reinforcement of selfprotection and protection of privilege.75 All of this is working in the opposite
direction of an ethical approach to school finance reform or a legitimation of
reform. At the end of his analysis, Wallerstein mused:
Will people in power just yield their privilege? Of course not; they never do.
Sometimes they concede parts of it, but only as a tactic retain most of it.
People in power have never been as powerful as they are in the contemporary
world. And people out of power (or at least many of them) have never been as
badly off, certainly relatively, and to a considerable extent, absolutely. So

72.
73.
74.
75.

IMMANEUL WALLERSTEIN, UTOPISTICS 30-31(1998).
Id. at 32.
Id.
Id. at 46-50.
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polarization is the greatest it has ever been which means that noble
renunciation of privilege is the least likely outcome.76

This is a sobering reflection for those interested in school finance reform either
on a legal basis or on an ethical basis.
VI. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
Several conclusions can be drawn from an analysis of this situation.
School finance theory and ethical theory would seem to support strongly the
equal treatment of all children in the financing of public schools and undergird
efforts to ensure equal educational opportunity. There does not seem to be any
valid ethical reason for the state not to consider all children to be equal.
However, such arguments have never been widely accepted in the public
policy arena. The tugs of self-interest and the protection of the privilege of the
affluent seem to be too strong for the moral issues to prevail. While various
scholars have developed the basis in legal theory to move toward school
finance reform, the courts have not accepted this view and, in general, have not
invalidated state systems of school finance on equal protection grounds.77
From the perspective of the judiciary, children are not considered to be equal
when school funding is involved. Legal theory, as accepted by the courts, is
not congruent with school finance theory and ethical theory.
Any possibilities of rectifying this incongruency to achieve legitimate
school finance reform seems to be less as we have left a worldview rooted in
modernism and moved to a post-modern environment. Modernism seemed
more open to the arguments of school finance theorists and ethicists.
Therefore, the door on reform may have closed.
This analysis suggests that the opportunities for school finance reform may
be past and that the current cultural and political environments are not
conducive to the policy context that currently exists. While I do not find this
argument pleasant to make, I invite the engagement of other scholars on the
issues.

76. Id. at 89.
77. See William S. Koski, Of Fuzzy Standards and Institutional Constraints: A ReExamination of the Jurisprudential History of Education Finance Reform Litigation, 43 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 1185, 1223 (discussing Rodriquez as the end of federal equal protection
litigation).

